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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals misapply this Court's 
decision of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(1982) in determining the elements necessary to prove intentional 
interference with economic relations. Specifically, did the Court 
of Appeals err in concluding that when a defendant is charged with 
interferring with another by "improper means" that the defendant's 
Supreme Court No. 
(Priority Category 13) 
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good faith belief in such conduct is not relevant in determining 
whether the means are "improper", that the violation of any 
statute, regulation, or rule of: conduct allows immediate 
liability, and that "good faith" is equivalent to a "privilege"? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals depart from the usual 
course of judicial proceedings by misapplying appellate rules. 
Specifically, when findings of fact do not include a basis for 
special damages and the lower :ourt states to the parties that no 
specific basis for the award is required to be given since the 
judgment is for general damages only, can an appellate court 
affirm the judgment based on its own belief as to what the special 
damages should have been even when such belief is negated by 
direct findings of the lower court and even though the amount of 
damages under such belief is different that than initially awarded 
by the lower court? 
CITATION OF COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Sampson v. 
Richins is found at 102 Utah Adv. Rpts. 53. 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered February 
22, 1989. An extension of time to file the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on March 24, 1989 by Justice Howell. 
Jurisdiction to review the decision in question by writ of 
certiorari is granted pursuant to §78-2-2, U.C.A. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
There are no controlling statutes, ordinances, or 
constitutional provisions in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course 
of Proceedings. 
The original complaint in this case sought a judgment giving 
full faith and credit to a judgment entered in Oregon. Defendants 
filed a counterclaim alleging various defenses to the Oregon 
judgment and seeking six affirmative claims for relief on the 
counterclaim. The counterclaim, which is the heart of the present 
dispute, alleged that plaintiff John P. Sampson breached a 
fiduciary duty as an attorney to the defendants, failed to 
exercise reasonable care and skill of an attorney, made slanderous 
statements against defendants, intentionally and maliciously 
interferred with the defendants' existing and prospective 
contracts, and failed to provide an accounting of funds. 
Defendants sought compensatory and punitive damages, an 
accounting, and injunctive relief. 
The case was assigned to retired Judge Bryant Croft who 
conducted an eleven-day trial in February of 1986. In July of 
1986 Judge Croft presented the parties with a "Memorandum and 
Summation of Evidence" consisting of 177 pages and "Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdict" consisting of 234 pages. 
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdict 
is contained as a separate appendix to this Petition because of 
its size. A judgment was entered by the lower court finding in 
favor of plaintiff Milton Goff for $19,057 and finding against 
plaintiff John Sampson in various amounts totaling approximately 
$290,000. 
On appeal, this matter was first designated to be heard by 
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this Court and accordingly a number of motions were filed by both 
parties as to the composition of the record and in attempts to 
dismiss Sampson's appeal. Ultimately, this Court denied all of 
Defendants' efforts to dismiss the appeal of Sampson but also 
limited the scope of the record to be included to that which was 
originally designated by Sampson pro se on June 9, 1987. 
During this same period of time a complaint was filed by 
defendant Paul Richins against Sampson with the Utah State Bar. 
Thirteen separate claims were made by Richins as to Sampson's 
conduct. On June 15, 1987 the screening panel of the Utah State 
Bar found Sampson had violated several ethical rules and issued a 
private reprimand to plaintiff Sampson finding that a more severe 
penalty was unwarranted since in the committee's opinion there was 
no dishonesty, deceit or bad rrotive in Sampson's conduct, and that 
he was at all times acting in the interest of his limited partner 
clients. On July 15, 1987 all further complaints filed against 
Sampson to the Bar Commission were dismissed by bar counsel. 
This case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to §78-2-2(4) U.C.A. A panel of the Court of Appeals, 
Judge Judy Billings presiding, affirmed the lower court's 
decision as to Sampson's appeal and also affirmed the lower 
court's judgment denying punitive damages against Sampson as to 
Richins' cross appeal. It is from this decision as to the 
affirmance of the counterclaim that this Writ is now taken. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Because of the voluminous nature of this case and the limited 
space available to present this Petition only a cursory 
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explanation of the facts which occurred in this case can now be 
made. All facts stated herein are taken directly from the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the lower court. Citations 
are to the page number of the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Verdict", with "F" for Findings portion, "C" for 
Conclusions portion, and "V" for Verdict portion. 
Defendant Paul Richins undertook to form a number of limited 
agricultural partnerships between 1973 through 1980. (F. 28). 
By 1980 these limited partnerships were in dire financial 
condition because of numerous problems they were having consisting 
of judgments, tax and security problems, and the failure of many 
limited partners to pay their assessed shares. (F. 60-72). 
In May of 1980 Sampson was contacted by some of these 
investors and asked to attend a meeting of one of the limited 
partnerships. (F. 7). During this meeting Sampson made various 
statements concerning the conduct of Richins which he thought was 
illegal. (F. 63). In subsequent meetings other limited partners 
requested Sampson to take necessary steps to relieve Richins as 
general partner and to liquidate in an orderly manner. (F. 64). 
In June of 1980 Richins as the general partner of the limited 
partnerships executed quit claim deeds to another of his corporate 
entities. (C. 168-69). He also signed various promissory notes 
in an attempt to show a debt owed to the general partner corporate 
entities. (F. 65-66). In June, Richins sent a letter to some of 
the limited partners stating he was withdrawing as general partner 
and requesting that they immediately repay any advances he had 
made. (F. 66-67) . 
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In the latter part of June a meeting was held at one of these 
limited partnership meetings at which time it was discussed that 
Sampson and his associates would buy out Richins' interest in the 
various partnerships. (F. 37-38, 68). A weak alliance was 
established during the next few months in which Sampson performed 
various legal services and assisted Richins in trying to stabilize 
the financial affairs of the partnerships. (F. 39-43). Both 
Sampson and Richins sent letters to the limited partners seeking 
approval of the settlement agreement. (F. 68-69). By November 
it became obvious that an agreement could not be reached since 
insufficient numbers of limited partnerships ratified the 
compromise. (Id.) . 
In November and January, Richins sent out further notices to 
the remaining limited partnerships announcing his withdrawal as 
the general partner and requesting return of any monies advanced. 
(F. 69). In December of 1980 Sampson sent out letters to all of 
the limited partners requesting that they return to him a signed 
power of attorney which would give him the ability to vote their 
rights. (F. 76). Using these powers of attorneys Sampson 
undertook to vote the Richins companies out as general partners 
and voted in his own professional corporation as the new 
substitute general partner. (F. 76-77). Later, he was notified 
by the bankruptcy court hearing the matter of one of Richins' 
companies that his professional corporation could not be a general 
partner. (F. 78). He subsequently incorporated AG Management, 
Inc. and attempted to substitute it as the general partner of the 
various partnerships. (F. 78). During this same period of time 
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Sampson took control of the limited partnerships and received and 
disbursed funds. Sampson kept detailed records of these receipts 
and disbursements. (F. 79). 
In October of 1982 Sampson attended an IRS sale and purchased 
all of Richins' claims in the various partnerships through his 
corporate entities. (F. 81-82). Later, in November of 1982 a 
Davis County judge ruled that AG Management was not the general 
partner of any of the partnerships and that Richins still had 
control. (F. 80-81). Sampson continued to operate the limited 
partnerships based upon his purchase of the IRS tax sale. (F. 
82) . 
Subsequently, a Davis County judge on two separate occasions 
in December of 1982 and July of 1983 ruled that the IRS sale was 
valid and that Sampson had authority to operate as a general 
partner. (F. 82).In May of 1984 a federal district judge entered 
an order voiding the IRS tax sale and stating that Sampson had no 
interest in the Richins' companies and therefore impliedly could 
not be a general partner. (F. 83). Richins took no action to 
vacate the Davis County Judge's order until January of 1985. (F. 
83-84) . In February of 1985 the state judge vacated his prior 
orders which were based on the assumption that the IRS sale was 
valid. (Id.). 
The lower court found that from 1980 through October 1984 
most of the funds that passed through Sampson's hands were paid 
out on partnership expenses and that there was no evidence that 
Sampson ended up with the partnership assets. (F. 86). 
The lower court in its Conclusions of Law found that both 
-7-
parties had done a number of illegal or improper acts during these 
transactions. As to Sampson, the court concluded that he had 
given erroneous legal advice at the various limited partnership 
meetings relating to Richins' power as a general partner (C. 166, 
170, 189}; Sampson had no legal authority to act on behalf of the 
limited partners even though the limited partners and Richins had 
agreed that he could represent them in an attempt to settle and 
buy out the general partner interest (C. 171); Sampson did not 
correctly substitute his professional corporation for that of 
Richins since he improperly signed the amended certificates (C. 
182); Sampson improperly purchased a judgment which had been 
entered against Richins in direct violation of §78-51-27 (F. 
109-10); Sampson incorrectly substituted AG Management for his 
professional corporation and therefore the latter had no legal 
authority. (C. 192). 
At the same time, the lower court found that Richins violated 
§48-2-9 U.C.A. in attempting to secretly deed the partnership 
properties to his other corporate entities (C. 168-69); that the 
promissory notes which he executed did not comply with the various 
articles of the limited partnerships and therefore was not 
repayable as a priority interest as he repeatedly proclaimed to 
the other limited partners (F. 102-03); that he gave contrary 
instructions to the limited partners telling them to elect a new 
general partner while at the same time telling them that the 
partnership had been terminated and the assets would be 
distributed (C. 170-7D; and that he erroneously sent termination 
letters of the general partner's interest in direct violation of 
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the partnership agreements and had misinterpreted §48-2-20 
concerning the withdrawal of a general partner. (C. 177-78). 
The court found that as to Count I Sampson had violated the 
attorney-client relationship but found no evidence of any damage 
having occurred. As to Count II he found that Sampson was 
negligent in handling several lawsuits and awarded some $2,000 for 
the cost incurred in setting aside a default judgment which had 
been entered. 
The court found that Sampson had intentionally interferred 
with some of the defendants as claimed in the Fourth Cause of 
Action on the Counterclaim. The Court specifically rejected each 
and every damage theory asserted by Defendants but concluded that 
they were entitled to an award of $250,000 as "consequential 
damages" and some $40,000 as damages for equity of defendants' own 
limited partnerships. The court rejected any claim for an 
accounting as well as a claim for an injunction. 
The lower court denied punitive damages against Sampson. The 
court found that Sampson acted in good faith in attempting to 
negotiate settlements with Richins for the benefit of the limited 
partnerships. (F. 140). The court specifically found that 
Sampson honestly believed that he was empowered to act for the 
limited partnerships through various devices during the four-year 
operation- (F. 143-44). 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISCONSTRUED THIS 
COURT'S DECISION OF LEIGH FURNITURE AMD 
HAS MISSTATED THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FIND 
THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
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ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
In 1982 this Court in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isomf 
657 P.2d 293, for the first tine recognized the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
Since that decision there has been no other reported Utah 
appellate case involving the interpretation of that decision or of 
the elements required to establish this cause of action. The 
instant case is therefore the most recent pronouncement of the 
Utah law as to this often-used claim for relief. The decision of 
the Court of Appeals, however, has misinterpreted both this 
Court's prior decision and the necessary elements required for a 
plaintiff to prevail. It is for this reason that this Court 
should review the present controversy in order to correct the 
necessary elements of this tort. 
In the Leigh Furniture case this Court adopted an 
approach utilized by the Oregon Supreme Court in defining the 
elements required to prove an action for intentional interference 
of economic relations. 657 P.2d at 304. In order to recover 
damages this Court held that a plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant intentionally interferred with the plaintiff's existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. Furthermore, 
"privilege is an affirmative defense which does not become an 
issue unless 'the acts charged would be tortious on the part of an 
unprivileged defendant'." Id. at 304. 
In Leigh Furniture this Court concluded that in spite of 
protracted action by the defendant against the plaintiff the 
-10-
evidence would not support a jury finding that the defendant's 
predominant purpose was to ruin Isom's business merely for the 
sake of injury alone and therefore refused to find an improper 
motive in the actions of the defendant. Id. at 308. 
As to improper means this Court stated: 
The alternative requirement of improper means 
is satisfied when the means used to interfere with 
a party's economic relations are contrary to law, 
such as violations of statutes, regulations, or 
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are 
clearly "improper" means of interference. 
"Commonly included among improper means are 
violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Means may 
also be improper or wrongful because they violate 
"an established standard of a trade or 
profession." Id. at 308. (Citing Top Service Body 
Shop, Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371). 
This Court concluded that the defendant's pursuit of two 
groundless lawsuits against the plaintiff was an improper means. 
It also sustained a finding of punitive damages since there was 
sufficient evidence of malice to justify such an award. Id. at 
313. 
In its extensive decision the lower court listed nine 
specific acts which it believed constituted improper means as 
defined in the Leigh Furniture case. These included: (1) 
erroneous advice by Sampson that the markup charge by the 
defendants was a breach of a fiduciary duty owned to the 
partnership (Findings, p. 101); (2) Sampson's erroneous advice 
that the advances made by the general partners would not have to 
be repaid by the partnerships (Findings, pp. 103-05); (3) 
Sampson's acts of collecting money on behalf of the partnerships 
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(Findings, p. 105); (4) refusal of Sampson to deliver documents 
of foreclosure to Richins after requested (Findings, p. 106); (5) 
wrongfully utilizing a power of attorney to substitite general 
partners (Finding, p. 107); (6) failing to properly amend the 
limited partnership certificates (Findings, p. 109); (7) 
obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment in violation of 
§78-51-27 (Findings, p. 109); (8) Sampson substituting his 
clients as plaintiffs in the Osborn case in violation of 
§78-51-27 (Findings, p. 110); and (9) making use of facts 
obtained while involved as an attorney client in violation of 
ethical standards (Findings, p. 116). 
Richins in the Court of Appeals expanded the "improper means" 
actually relied upon by the lower court to a claimed 22 separate 
acts. (Respondents' and Cross Appellants' Brief, pp. 37-40). 
The Court of Appeals listed 13 specific acts that "taken together 
constitute improper means as defined by the Utah court in Leigh 
Furniture." 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 56-57. 
The Court of Appeals also found that "negating 'good faith' 
is not an element of a prima facie case of intentional 
interference with economic relations in Utah." The Court concluded 
that if Sampson uses the term "good faith" in the sense that he is 
claiming his acts were "privileged" then Sampson had the burden of 
raising this issue as an affirmative defense. 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. 
57. 
Petitioner submits that the decision by the Court of Appeals 
is erroneous for three reasons: first, the majority of the acts 
listed by the Court of Appeals do not constitute "improper means" 
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under this Court's decision in Leigh or in the Oregon decisions 
upon which this Court relied; second, the lower court and the 
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that a lack good faith is a 
prima facie element for a plaintiff to establish to show certain 
actions are indeed "improper"; third, the element of "good faith" 
is not equated to a privilege and therefore is not an affirmative 
burden upon a defendant. 
Many of the "improper means" listed by the Court of Appeals 
concerned improper advice or actions taken under erroneous 
assumptions. For example, Sampson's statements to the limited 
partners concerning the markups and the loan advances while 
characterized by the Court of Appeals as being "misrepresented" 
and "false" were found by the lower court merely to be errors in 
legal opinion. (Conclusions, p. 189; 166, 170). Other alleged 
improper means include technical violations of statutes such as 
the failure to properly amend the certificates of limited 
partnerships or to properly substitute one general partner for 
another. The third category concerns violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility as an attorney. The fourth and final 
category includes alleged wrongful action taken with regard to the 
corporate assets and liabilities during the four years that 
Sampson acted as general partner. 
The majority of the listed acts are not the type of predatory 
conduct which should give rise to a claim of intentional 
interference with economic relations and, for example, the failure 
to give proper legal advice should not subject every practicing 
attorney to a subsequent claim five years later. In Leigh 
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Furniture, for example, in spite of the numerous acts of the 
defendant against the plaintiff in the operation of the business, 
657 P.2d at 306, this Court found only the bringing of "two 
groundless lawsuits" as the improper means of interference. Idk_ 
at 308-309. Thus, not every act undertaken in a business 
controversy can be deemed to be a "improper means." 
Likewise, merely because a person fails to amend limited 
partnership agreements should not make him subject to a tortious 
interference claim. This Court and the Oregon Courts did not 
intend every innocent violation of any rule or statute to give 
rise to liability when no predatory conduct is involved. Here 
there was no violence, deceit, or unfounded litigation which is 
the conduct that the "improper means" test was designed to 
prevent. 
The second error committed by the Court of Appeals was 
failing to give any credance to Sampson's intent. The Court of 
Appeals and the lower court merely concluded that once a statute 
has been shown to have been violated that this violation on its 
face constitutes grounds for allowing imposition of damages. The 
good faith or intent of the perpetrator was not considered 
relevant by either the Court of Appeals or the lower court. 
Although the lower court found that Sampson had an improper 
purpose in the actions he took, the Court of Appeals did not 
address the issue of "improper purpose" but chose to affirm only 
upon "improper means". 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 56. Petitioner 
submits that the lower court was clearly wrong in concluding that 
an improper purpose existed in Sampson's conduct since there is no 
question from the court's own factual findings that he was 
representing a number of limited partners who had substantial 
investments in the partnerships and who had a real motive in 
trying to keep the businesses operating. See, Serafino v. Palm 
Terrace Apts., Inc., 343 S.2d 851 (Fla. App. 1976); Re_sJ:^ temen_t 
of Torts 2d, §769. 
The lower court specifically found in denying punitive 
damages that Sampson acted in good faith throughout these 
proceedings even though many of his actions were ultimately 
declared wrong or illegal by courts along the way. See, 
Findings of Fact, pp. 139-144. In one particular passage the 
lower court made this summary: 
[I]t is my opinion that as wrong as Sampson 
was in many of the things he did, I think he 
believed himself to be right in doing what he did 
and the way he did them. He should have known the 
law, but I do not believe he intentionally 
violated it. For almost six months he worked 
amicably with Richins on settlement. When that 
failed, by powers of attorney he got proxies to 
vote the limited partners' interests. He did so, 
electing his PC general partner. When that was 
said to be contrary to law, he voted AG Management 
in as a general partner and so operated. By the 
time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal, Sampson was 
able to carry on under a color of authority by 
receipt of an IRS certificate of sale, followed by 
two favorable rulings by Judge Cornaby until the 
IRS sale was voided in May, 1964 (sic) by a 
federal court order. 
The bitterness and contention that developed 
and existed between the two men was long and drawn 
out and led to prolonged controversies which had 
its roots in serious problems already existing 
before Sampson entered the ring. But I do not 
believe the evidence preponderates in establishing 
the type of willful and malicious conduct, nor the 
lessened type, required by our Supreme Court 
decision to justify or support an award of 
punitive damages and I so find. Findings of Fact, 
pp. 143-44. 
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Thus, in spite of the conclusion by the lower court that 
Sampson sincerely believed that the actions he was taking were 
valid during the entire course of proceedings, the court concluded 
that the acts themselves constituted an illegal means giving rise 
to liability. Thus, intent and motivation behind the acts was not 
considered relevant by either the lower court or the Court of 
Appeals. The failure to examine good faith and intent is clearly 
improper under the standards adopted by this Court. 
Before a "means" can be deemed to be "improper" the conduct 
of the accused must be examined. For example, in GM Ambulance 
v. Canyon State Ambulance, 739 P.2d 203 (Ariz. App. 1987) an 
ambulance company was sued by a competitor on the basis that: it 
had violated a state law. The defendant countered by stating it 
had received written permission from the governing state agency to 
perform the conduct which was later ruled illegal. The Arizona 
Court of Appeals cited the Leigh Furniture case as standing 
for the proposition that conduct specifically in violation of 
statutory provisions has been held as an improper interference. 
The Court stated, however: 
We believe, however, that Canyon State's 
violation of the statute is outweighed by the good 
faith reliance on the letter. Canyon State relied 
on the opinion of the very department charged with 
regulating its conduct. Under such circumstances 
we do not believe that it acted improperly so as 
to subject itself to liability for the tort of 
interference with contract. Id. at 205. 
This Court in Leigh Furniture recognized that the terms 
"improper means or improper purpose" are functionally equivalent 
to "wrongful or malicious". 657 P.2d at 305. Certainly, the mere 
— 1 C — 
fact that a person improperly amends a certificate of limited 
partnership, in good faith attempts to use an invalid power of 
attorney, or fails to properly transfer authority from one general 
partner to another should not give rise to tortious liability 
without the showing of bad faith or maliciousness. 
This error is further compounded by the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that "good faith" and "privilege" are the same and that 
it is up to Sam[pson to bear that burden. 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 
57. The Oregon Supreme Court upon which this Court based its 
standard of intentional interference defined a privilege as 
follows: 
In Wampler, we said that a person who 
interferes with a contract is not always 
responsible for the resultant injury. When the 
person acts to promote ". . .an interest which is 
equal or superior in social value to that with 
which he interferes, his actions are said to be 
privileged or justified. Welch v. Bamcorp 
Management Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172, 176 (Or. 
1983) . 
Thus, even after a court has concluded that certain conduct 
would give rise to liability a defendant can claim a privilege on 
the assertion that he is essentially exempt from such liability 
because of a status or other reason. For example, a business 
advisor is privileged to give advice without fear of a tortious 
suit. Parker v. Gordon, 442 S.2d 273 (Fla. App. 1984); Los 
Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982). 
This privilege exists even if the financial advisor receives a 
financial gain himself. Lichtie v. U.S. Home Corp., 655 F. Supp. 
1026 (D. Utah 1987) . 
If the standard of tortious interference is as stated by the 
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Utah Court of Appeals a defendant who can claim no legal privilege 
but who acts in complete good faith in a transaction is subject 
to liability even upon the showing of a technical violation of a 
statute or regulation. Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation 
there is no opportunity for a defendant to argue his motive if the 
plaintiff is proceeding under the "improper means" course of 
proving liability. The filing of any lawsuit which is later lost,. 
the reliance upon any legal advice which is later proven wrong, or 
a number of other occurrences which happen daily in business 
transactions would, under the Court of Appeals' analysis, give 
rise to immediate liability regardless of the motive or intention 
of the party. 
It is therefore essential that this Court accept certiorari 
of this case so that it can clarify that before the violation of a 
statute, regulation, or course of conduct can be deemed "improper" 
there must be established a malicious or bad faith motive in 
perpetrating these acts. Furthermore, it is critical that this 
Court clearly define the types of "means" which can give rise to 
liability to eliminate conduct which clearly was never intended to 
give rise to tortious liability. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED 
APPELLATE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN 
CREATING A FINDING OF FACT FOR SPECIAL 
DAMAGES WHICH WAS NEVER MADE BY THE 
LOWER COURT AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO 
THE LOWER COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS. 
Anyone reading the 234-page opinion of Judge Croft would 
believe that no substantial damage had been awarded to the 
defendants against Sampson until the very last page of the opinion 
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is read. In other words, the $250,000 figure appears like a 
phantom in the night. There is no previous reference to this 
amount in either the Findings, Conclusions or Verdict. 
The lower court specifically rejected each and every damage 
claim asserted by Richins against Sampson. See, Verdict, pp. 
228-30; Findings, p. 105, 124-37; Conclusions, p. 198-205, 215-16; 
and Verdict, p. 209-32. 
The only reference to the $250,000 judgment is found on page 
232, two pages before the decision ends. The court stated: 
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in 
contract, rendering liability for damages for 
either the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the 
contract or consequential for which the tortious 
interference is the legal cause. I think as to 
some claim for damages, of at least a 
consequential nature, have been shown with a 
reasonable degree of certainty by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The only other indication giving any enlightenment as to ^he 
composition of the $250,000 figure is seen in the Court's oral 
colloquy with Sampson's trial counsel during the hearing to 
amend the Findings. A copy of this portion of the transcript is 
contained in the appendix of this Petition. The lower court 
basically took the position that the $250,000 figure was analogous 
to a jury bringing in a $25,000 figure in a $100,000 suit. (Tr. 
26) . The Court stated that ^ it was not obligated to say what the 
$250,000 is comprised. (Tr. 31). The Court stated that 
"recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships. It was a tort 
just like you run a red light and crash into your car. I commit a 
tort and you are injured. And you are entitled to recover 
damages. But how much? Well, the jury said $25,000. You wanted 
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$100,000, You get $25,000, you see." (Tr. 23). 
The Court concluded by saying that in no sense of the word 
could it give Richins $5 million, $6 million, $9 million or $12 
million as he requested because the evidence wasn't there. The 
$250,000 is just the amount the court came up with. It is not, 
according to the court, required to break it down into advances 
not recovered, improper expenditure of attorney fees by Sampson, 
or overhead expenses. (Tr. 31). 
It is therefore obvious from reviewing the Findings of the 
lower court together with the court's own explanation that it 
regarded the award of $250,000 as general damages with no 
requirement to specifically explain the basis. Sampson vigorously 
argued before the Court of Appeals that awards in tortious 
interference cases are of a nature of a special damage and that 
the lower court's reasoning was incorrect. See, Restatement of 
Torts 2d, §774A; 25 C.J.S. §2 Damages, p. 617; Hycel Inc. v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 190, 193 (D. Tex. 1971) ; 
Clark v. Ferro Corp., 237 F. Supp. 230, 238 (D. Tenn. 1964). 
The Court of Appeals agreed with Sampson's assertion by 
stating "we agree that Judge Croft was under the mistaken belief 
that he need not identify the exact basis for his award." The 
Court of Appeals then stated, "However, this Court can affirm the 
judgment if any legal basis exists to justify the trial court's 
award. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C. Associates, 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) 
The Court of Appeals then undertook to justify the award of 
damages based upon the preceding rule of appellate review together 
with the other principle that once damages have been established 
the exact amount may be based upon estimations since the defendant 
may not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be 
proved with precision. 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 58. 
The Court of Appeals then took an incredible leap and 
essentially wrote its own Finding of Fact as to what the $250,000 
was based upon. The Court concluded that because Judge Winder in 
May of 1984 had found the IRS sale to be invalid that from that 
point on all money retained in the bank account of the general 
partner by Sampson must necessarily have been damages accruing to 
the defendant. 
This conclusion is remarkable for several reasons. First, by 
Judge Croft's own finding the amount in the bank account as of 
October 29, 1984 would have been $288,597—not $250,000. The rule 
cited by the Court of Appeals as to the approximation of uncertain 
damages applies to cases involving damages such as lost profits cr 
loss of a bargin but certainly does not apply to a simple 
arithematic calculation of a bank account. Second, while the 
final accounting may have occurred on October 29, 1984 it was not 
until January 5, 1985 that Richins obtained an order from Judge 
Cornaby vacating his prior orders which gave Sampson the right to 
control the partnership. (F. 83-84). Thus, if any date was to 
have any relevance at all when Sampson ceased having legal 
authority to operate the corporation it would have been the 
January date to which no evidence was ever offered by Richins. 
Next, the "finding" of the Court of Appeals assumed that the 
assets in the bank were not used on behalf of the limited 
-21-
partnerships but were retained by Sampson. The lower court 
specifically found this not to be the case. The Court stated: 
Upon closing argument counsel for defendants 
stated that Sampson and twelve people ended up 
with all the "Richtron assets'1. He probably meant 
partnership assets, but as I noted in my Findings 
and Conclusions, no evidence was placed in the 
record establishing that such was in fact the 
case, but if so, absent any such evidence, I 
cannot consider this statement as a factor upon 
which this decision can be made. I have 
repeatedly noted the absence of evidence as to 
what finally happened to the partnerships and 
their properties other than a schedule showing 
only the date upon which foreclosures presumably 
took place. (F. 221-222). 
The Court also noted a short time later, "I think it is clear from 
the evidence that most of the funds that passed through Sampson's 
hands were paid out on partnership expenses." (F. 222). 
The Court of Appeals recognized the inconsistency in its 
creation of a finding not made by the lower court. It stated, 
however: 
There are admittedly alternative, inconsistent 
findings before this Court, and ordinarily we 
would resort to the underlying record to determine 
which finding of fact is accurate. However, 
Sampson's failure to provide a complete transcript 
prevents us from reviewing the underlying 
evidence. Thus, we assume the evidence supports 
the trial court's Findings of Fact which in turn 
supports its ultimate damage award. See, e.g., 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 
(Utah 1988). 102 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 58. 
Certiorari is appropriate in this case since the Court of 
Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings which requires this Court's power of 
supervision to be exercised. The rule concerning affirming a 
judgment of the lower court was never meant to allow an appellate 
court to create a factual finding which does not exist. The rule 
is strictly limited to alternative legal theories. See, e.g. 
Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C. Associates, 752 P.2d 392 (Utah 1983) 
(while one construction of the contract was erroneous another 
construction allowed affirmance of the lower court); Rice,_Melty 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1932) 
(decision based upon statute of limitation net addressed since 
parole evidence rule precluded judgment in plaintiff's favor); 
Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1983) (lower court 
decision based on constructive trust erroneous but decision 
affirmed on basis of a purchase money resulting trust). The 
appellate rule of construction cannot be used to create factual 
findings which are not present in the lower court's findings :>f 
fact and conclusions of law. 
It is fundamental that the failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the 
facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. 
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). The findings of fact must 
show that the courtfs judgment or decree "follows logically from 
and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1986). The findings "should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was reached." 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Where special 
findings have been made, an appellate court cannot assume a 
non-existent factual finding which is a material issue to 
recovery. "Because the trial judge elected to make special 
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findings and because he did not make a finding on all material 
factual issues necessary to recovery, the judgment must be 
reversed." Briscoe v. Pittman, 522 P.2d 886 (Or. 1974). The 
Supreme Court of New Mexico found reversible error in the failure 
of the lower court to enter findings respecting special damages 
allegedly suffered by plaintiffs caused by odors emitted by the 
defendant's plant. Aguayl v. Village of Chama, 449 P.2d 331 (N.M. 
1969) . 
It is difficult to conceive of a more flagrant violation of 
the preceding rules of appellate construction than in the instant 
case. Here, the lower court entered the figure of $250,000 as 
damages with no attempt to explain the special nature of such 
award. The reason for such failure was simply the lower court's 
erroneous conclusion that consequential damages in tortious 
interference cases are of a general nature and do not have to be 
itemized. The court clearly stated this to counsel in the motion 
to amend the findings. 
The Court of Appeals recognized the error committed by the 
lower court but rather than vacating the decision or, at the 
minimum, remanding it for further proceedings undertook to create 
findings of special damages on its own accord even though (1) the 
amount of damages was different than that awarded by the lower 
court; (2) the time utilized by the Court of Appeals was 
inconsistent with the lower court's findings as to when Sampson 
lost the color of authority to act on behalf of the partners; (3) 
the award was inconsistent with the lower court's specific 
conclusions that there was no showing that Sampson retained any of 
the funds for his own personal use. 
This Court should therefore exercise its supervisory powers 
to correct this erroneous application of established rules of 
appellate procedure, 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court and the Court of Appeals must 
be reviewed by this Court in order to avoid misapplication of 
principles governing causes of action in claims of tortious 
interference. The decision as it is now written allows any 
plaintiff to claim damages for the violation of any trifling 
regulation, statute, or code of ethics without any regard of the 
motivation or intent of the defendant. This Court should accept 
this case for the purpose of clarifying the type of "improper 
means" which give rise to liability as well as clarifying how the 
element of "good faith" comes into play as to the various burdens 
of the parties. 
Second, while the issue of damages will not affect any other 
persons except that of the defendant the Court of Appeals' 
misapplication of established rules of appellate procedure require 
this Court's exercise of its supervisory powers to correct an 
obvious injustice. 
For these reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Writ 
of Certiorari be granted. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 1989. 
Craig S. C$6k 
Attorney for John P. Sampson 
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the court must consider the juvenile's right to a fair 
trial under the sixth amendment. Id. The court 
concluded that closure should not occur unless the 
court makes specific supported findings that closure 
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. The court then reve-
rsed the trial court's closure order due to unsupp-
orted factual findings. Id. at 580-81. 
In Taylor v. State, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert, 
denied 459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the 
juvenile court's order permitting the media to 
attend a hearing involving a juvenile charged with 
committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The 
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to det-
ermine whether the public should be excluded from 
the proceedings and stated that the court shall con-
sider that the best interests of the community are 
generally served by the public's ability to obtain 
information about charges that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult. The court concluded that 
under the express language of the statute, the 
charged crime fell within the class of cases for which 
access and disclosure are deemed generally to serve 
the best interest of the public. Taylor, 438 N.£.2d at 
280-81. 
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two 
types of proceedings in its arguments, and, there-
fore, contends that all types of juvenile court proc-
eedings should be presumptively open to the public. 
4. Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but 
because the section is substantive rather than proc-
edural, we apply the version of the statute in effect 
at the time the cause of action arose. Carlucci v. 
Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336 
(Utah 1986)). Also, the changes made in the statute 
do not affect our analysis. 
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which states 
"[a]U courts shall be open,* provides further support 
for its position that juvenile court proceedings 
should be presumptively open. Article I, section 11 
provides, 'All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State ... any civil cause to which he 
is a party." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
section 11 "guarantees access to the courts and a 
judicial procedure that is based on fairness and 
equality." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670, 675 (Utah 1985). In addition, the constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courthouse was intended 
to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries 
to person, property or reputation. Id. We reject 
Kearns-Tribune's suggestion that section 11 man-
dates that all courts should be physically open. In 
addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted how the 
guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy 
to injury is relevant to arguments relating to 
freedom of the press. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiff-appellant, John P. Sampson, appeals 
the money judgment entered against him in favor 
of defendants-respondents, Richtron, Inc., Rk-
htron Financial Corporation, and Richtron 
General (referred to collectively throughout this 
opinion as 'Rkhtron'). The trial court found 
Sampson intentionally interfered with Ricntron's 
economic relations and awarded judgment to 1) 
Richtron Financial Corporation, as a limited 
partner, in the amount of $30,974.50, 2) Rich-
tron, Inc., as a limited partner, in the amount of 
$4,222.50, and 3) Richtron, Inc. and Rkhtron 
General, as general partners, in the amount of 
$250,000. Richtron cross-appeals the trial 
court's refusal to award additional compensatory 
and punitive damages. We affirm. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Sampson filed the original complaint in this case 
to enforce an Oregon judgment previously obta-
ined by Robert Osborn against Richtron which 
Sampson subsequently purchased from Osborn. 
Richtron answered the complaint alleging a 
variety of defenses to the Oregon judgment, and 
counterdaimed seeking six affirmative claims for 
relief against Sampson. 
The case was tried without a jury before Senior 
Judge Bryant Croft. During the eleven-day trial, 
the court heard twenty-three witnesses and rec-
eived approximately 398 exhibiu. Judge Croft 
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drafted a 177 page 'memorandum and summation 
of evidence* and entered "findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and verdict" consisting of 234 
pages. Both counsel in their briefs and this court 
commend Judge Croft for his extraordinary 
efforts. 
In bringing this appeal, Sampson ordered only 
a portion of the transcript of the proceedings 
below. Subsequent motions to supplement the 
record were denied. Richtron did not order addi-
tional portions for purposes of its cross-appeal. 
Consequently, both parties concede they are 
bound by Judge Croft's voluminous findings of 
fact, and only contend on appeal that the trial 
court's findings of fact do not support its concl-
usions of law and judgment. Specifically, 
Sampson claims the trial court's findings do not 
support the elements of intentional interference 
with Rkhtron's economic relations nor the corr-
esponding damages awarded to Richtron. Rich-
tron cross-appeals claiming the trial court erred 
1) in refusing to award additional compensatory 
damages for partnership funds diverted by 
Sampson and for loans Richtron advanced to the 
partnerships, and 2) in refusing to award Richtron 
punitive damages. 
FACTS 
We set out only those facts found by the trial 
court that are relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Between October 15, 1973, and March 1, 1980, 
Paul Richins created twenty-five limited partn-
erships in which either Richtron, Inc., or Richtron 
General, its subsidiary, acted as the sole general 
partner. Both Richtron, Inc. and Richtron 
General were owned and controlled by Richins. 
The limited partnerships were created for the 
purpose of acquiring, operating, and holding for 
resale farm properties located in the states of 
Utah, Idaho, and Oregon. 
Substantially identical limited partnership agr-
eements were prepared for each of the twenty-
five partnerships providing, in relevant part, that 
the general partner had the exclusive authority to 
conduct the affairs of the limited partnerships, 
and that the limited partners were required to 
make annual cash contributions to meet partner-
ship expenses. The agreements disclosed that the 
agricultural properties previously purchased on 
contract by one of the Richtron companies were 
being resold to the limited partnerships at a 
profit. 
During 1979 and early 1980, many of the 
limited partners refused to pay the partnership 
expense assessments made by Richtron. By May 
1990, the limited partnerships were confronted 
with substantial and increasing financial difficul-
ties due, in part, to the failure of many limited 
partners to pay their agreed assessments andv in 
part, to overall management problems. As a 
result, Richtron loaned substantial amounts of 
money to the limited partnershitK to meet delin-
quent and current land contract installment obli-
.garjons, well-drilling expenses, as well as other 
operating expenses. By June 1980, the aggregate 
amount of Rkhtron's loans, all of which were 
required by the partnership agreements to be 
repaid, exceeded $300,000. 
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Sampson first became involved with the limited 
partnerships in May 1980, when he was retained 
as an attorney by two limited partners to attend 1 
meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners. 
Richins called the meeting to discuss, among 
other financial concerns, the existence of the 
"Osborn judgment' and that Osborn was willing 
to settle the dispute upon payment of a stipulated 
sum. The trial court made the following findings 
concerning Sampson's participation in the May 
1980 meeting: 
[Sampson's] actions there were a bit 
more than just privately counseling his 
two clients, for he not only orally 
recommended to those at the meeting 
and got started the movement to have 
Richtron Financial file for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 proceedings, but he 
also expressed the legal opinion to all 
present that he did not think Richtron 
Financial could keep the mark-up 
equity arising from Richtron Finan-
cial's resale of the farm property to 
the Catlow Valley partnerships for an 
amount in excess of what it paid for 
it, which was a theme winch Sampson 
repeatedly expressed in the months 
and years ahead. 
It was at this meeting that Sampson began his 
concentrated efforts to take control of the twenty-
five limited partnerships. Sampson never invested 
in any of the partnerships, and from all indicat-
ions, throughout his efforts, represented only two 
of approximately 130 limited partners. 
In June 1980, as a result of ongoing pressure 
from Sampson, Richins purported to cause the 
withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron 
General as general partners of the limited partn-
erships. Richins informed the limited partners that 
he would proceed to wind up and terminate par-
tnership affairs, but none of the partnerships were 
ever terminated. Following his announcement, 
Richins agreed to permit Sampson to receive 
partnership assessments. Under this agreement, 
Sampson was required to forward funds to Ric-
htron to pay pressing partnership obligations. 
Sampson did not comply with the agreement, and 
instead placed partnership contributions in his 
trust accounts. 
At the Catlow Valley partnership meeting, 
Sampson suggested to his clients that they purc-
hase all of Rkhtron's interests in the limited 
partnerships. Thereafter, Sampson and Richins 
attempted to negotiate a buy-out of Rkhtron's 
interests for $700,000. The buy-out agreement 
provided that Richtron would be reimbursed for 
the loans it had made to the limited partnerships. 
Despite the negotiations between Sampson and 
Rkhins, Sampson informed a number of limited 
partners that Richtron was not entitled to repay-
ment. Sampson expressed this opinion frequently 
both orally and through letters sent to all inves-
tors. As a result of Sampson's statements, many 
of the limited partners objected to the buy-out 
agreement, and no sale of Rkhtron's interest 
occurred. Soon after the buy-out agreement 
failed, Sampson resumed his efforts to take 
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control of the partnerships and exclude Richins. 
Sampson first attempted to gam control by 
requesting the limited partners to execute powers 
of attorney. Sampson told the partners that such 
action was necessary to remove Richins and his 
companies as general partners and to commence 
legal action against them. 
After obtaining powers of attorney from an 
unknown number of limited partners, Sampson 
incorporated the John P. Sampson Professional 
Corporation. Relying on the powers of attorney, 
Sampson attempted to elect his professional cor-
poration as the successor general partner of each 
of the limited partnerships, in violation of the 
Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§16-11-1 to-15 (1987). 
Sampson was notified by court order that his 
corporation was not authorized to become a 
general partner in an agricultural enterprise. 
Thereafter, Sampson incorporated Ag Manage-
ment, and attempted to substitute it as general 
partner of the limited partnerships. On November 
24, 1982, a district court ruled that Sampson's 
efforts to substitute Ag Management as the 
general partner were legally invalid, and that 
Richtron was and always had been the only aut-
horized general partner to act on behalf of the 
limited partnerships. 
Within seven months of Sampson's attendance 
Mt the Citlow VtUey partnership meeting, 
Sampson had assumed actual but not legal control 
of the twenty-five partnerships through a variety 
of means and was receiving and disbursing all 
partnership funds at his discretion. He continued 
his unauthorized control for over four years 
acting both in his individual capacity and as an 
attorney representing the interests of two limited 
partners. During this same period, Sampson also 
acted as legal counsel for Richtron, and on 
several occasions defended Richtron in lawsuits. 
In at least five instances, however, Sampson 
neglected the lawsuits against Richtron and 
allowed them to go to default. Sampson, on other 
occasions, revealed to third parties confidential 
information he had obtained in the course of his 
representation of Richtron. 
During the summer of 1982, Sampson freque-
ntly contacted the Internal Revenue Service, and 
provided it with information concerning Rich-
tron's internal business affairs. Eventually, the 
IRS conducted a tax sale wherein Sampson app-
eared as the only bidder, and purportedly acqu-
ired substantially all of Richtron's assets. A 
United States district court judge voided the tax 
sale by court order dated May 16,1984. 
From June 27, 1980, to October 29, 1984, 
approximately $1,522,000 in limited partnership 
funds were deposited in the various accounts over 
Which Sampson had control. From these acco-
unts, Sampson withdrew over $100,000 in atto-
rney fees and $78,000 to cover miscellaneous 
overhead expense. Despite several federal and 
state court orders declaring that neither Sampson 
nor Ag Management were authorized to act as 
general partners, Sampson continued to solicit 
and receive funds from limited partners and exe-
rcise control over the various limited partnerships. 
The trial court also found that throughout 
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Sampson's four-year period of control, he rep-
eatedly ignored Richtron's limited partnership 
interests by failing to communicate and generally 
keep Richtron abreast of partnership activities. 
Based on the facts set forth above. Judge Croft 
concluded that Sampson's intentional neglect of 
Richtron Financial's and Richtron, Inc.'s limited 
partnership interests caused them to lose their 
original capital contributions. Accordingly, Judge 
Croft awarded Richtron Financial $30,974 50, and 
Richtron, Inc. $4,222.50, which represented their 
respective capital interests. Finally, Judge Croft 
awarded Richtron General and Richtron, Inc , as 
general partners, $250,000 based on Sampson's 
intentional interference with their economic rela-
tions. 
Both Sampson and Richtron argue on appeal 
that the trial court's legal conclusions and judg-
ment are not supported by its findings of fact As 
a subsidiary issue, Sampson claims that many of 
Judge Croft's 'findings of fact* are really 
'conclusions of law/ and therefore, his challe-
nges are properly before this court notwithstan-
ding his failure to order a complete transcript of 
the proceedings below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
R. Utah Ct. App. ll(eX2) provides, with our 
emphasis, *[i]f the appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a Finding or conclusion is unsupported 
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all evi-
dence relevant to such finding or conclusion * In 
essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this 
court with Mil evidence relevant to the issues 
raised on appeal. 'Where the record before us is 
incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence 
as a whole and must therefore presume that the 
verdict was supported by admissible and compe-
tent evidence.' Smith v. Vmacb, 699 P 2d 763, 
765 (Utah 1985). Accord flevan v. J.H. Constr 
Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983Km absence of 
a transcript, we presume the trial proceedings 
were proper and judgment was supported by the 
evidence). 
Accordingly, because the enure record in this 
case is not before this court, we presume the trial 
court's findings are supported by competent and 
sufficient evidence, "[hjowever, ... the findings 
must themselves be sufficient to provide a sound 
foundation for the judgment, and conversely 
any proper judgment can only be entered in acc-
ordance with the findings.' Forbush v. Forbush, 
578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978). Therefore, our 
review is strictly (united to whether the trial 
court's findings of fact support its conclusions of 
law and judgment. 
In this regard, findings of fact 'must clearly 
indicate the 'mind of the court' and must resolve 
all issues of material fact necessary to justify the 
conclusions of law and judgment entered 
thereon/ Pmrks v. Zions First Ntt'l Bank, 673 
P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983Xfootnotes omitted). See 
Mlso KinkdlM v. fiaugft, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1983Kfaihire to enter adequate findings of fact is 
generally reversible error). 'Findings should be 
limited to the ultimate facts and if they ascertain 
ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform to the 
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pleadings and the evidence to support the judg-
ment, they will be regarded as sufficient ....* Pearson 
v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 
1577). A trial court need not resolve every confl-
kting evidentiary issue, "[njor is the court requ-
ired to negate allegations in its findings of facts.' 
Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 
1980). 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
In order to sustain a claim for intentional interf-
erence with prospective economic relations in 
Utah, a plaintiff must establish, '(1) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plain-
tiffs existing or potential economic relations,1 (2) 
for an improper purpose or by improper means, 
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff/ Leigh Furni-
ture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
(Utah 1982).* 
Improper Purpose or Means 
In order to establish 'improper purpose* a plai-
ntiff must demonstrate that the defendant's int-
erference is maliciously motivated, "in the sense 
of spite and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff 
for its own sake .../* Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d 
at 307 (quoting W. Prosser, HMndbook of Law of 
Torts §129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971)). In a case of 
mixed motives, a court must determine the defe-
ndant's predominant purpose underlying his 
conduct. Id. 'Problems inherent in proving mot-
ivation or purpose make it prudent for commer-
cial conduct to be regulated for the most part by 
the improper means alternative, which typically 
requires only a showing of particular conduct. ' Id, 
The improper means element 'is satisfied where 
the means used to interfere with a party's econ-
omic relations are contrary to law, such as viola-
tions of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tor-
tious in themselves and hence are clearly 
'improper' means of interference.' Leigh Furni-
ture, 657 PJtd at 306 (citations omitted). Impr-
oper means may also include "violence, threats 
or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, 
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or 
disparaging falsehoods." Id. (quoting Top Serv. 
Body Shop, Inc., 582 P-2d at 1371). 'Means, may 
also be improper or wrongful ) ecause they violate 
'an established standard of a trade or profes-
sion.'9 Id. 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we 
address Sampson's challenges in this appeal. 
First, Sampson claims the trial court's 'findings' 
that Sampson had an 'improper purpose' and 
employed 'improper means' are ultimate facts or, 
in the alternative, conclusions of law, and are not 
supported by the trial court's operative findings 
of fact. Conversely, Ricfatron claims that these 
'findings' are indeed findings of fact, and absent 
the entire record, are not subject to attack on 
appeal. See, e.g., Cornish Town v. Koikr, 758 
PM 919,922 (Utah 1988). 
We think the trial court's 'findings of fact' 
that Sampson employed 'improper means' or had 
an "improper purpose' are more accurately con-
sidered 'mixed questions of law and fact.' Cases 
UTAH 
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involving the application of law to facts are 
hopelessly at odds with one another as to whether 
the issue should be reviewed as a factual finding 
or a legal conclusion. See Weiner, The Civil 
Nonjury Trial and Law-Fact Distinction, 53 
Calif. L. Rev. 1020, 1021-22 (1967). See a/so 
Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of 
Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases -
Limiting the Rcmch of Pullman-Standard v. 
Swint, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 403, 416-17 (1983). 
However, we need not resolve the appropriate 
standard of review, as we find the trial court's 
voluminous and detailed operative factual find-
ings overwhelmingly support its ultimate determ-
ination that Sampson employed improper means 
as is discussed more fully below. Furthermore, 
because we need only find either 'improper 
purpose* <>r *iiprw«"cr means' to uphold the tnal 
court, we do not address the issue of "improper 
purpose/ 
Based on our review of Judge Croft's findings 
of fact, we note at least thirteen acts that, taken 
together, constitute improper means as defined by 
the Utah Court in Leigh Furniture. Specifically, 
these acts indude: 
1. Sampson repeatedly misrepresented 
to the limited partners that Rkhtron 
was not entitled to be reimbursed for 
the capital advances it made to the 
limited partnerships or the disclosed 
mark-ups on the agricultural prop-
erty sold to each of the limited part-
nerships. 
2. Sampson's frequent false statem-
ents that Rkhtron was not entitled to 
its loan advances or mark-ups prev-
ented an early settlement of the limited 
partnership affairs. 
3. Sampson undertook representation 
of Rkhtron in several matters and at 
the same time, undertook representa-
tion of interests that were clearly 
adverse to Rkhtron in violation of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility. 
4. After agreeing to represent Rkh-
tron's legal interest in civil matters, 
Sampson ignored these matters, and 
allowed at least five cases to go to 
default judgments against Rkhtron. 
5. Sampson disclosed to third parties 
confidential information he obtained 
during the course of his representation 
of Rkhtron in violation of his profe-
ssional and fkluciary obligations. 
6. Sampson repeatedly breached his 
original agreement to serve as a repo-
sitory for the deposit of partnership 
funds and insure that all such funds 
were duly transmitted to Rkhtron. 
Instead, Sampson placed partnership 
funds in his trust accounts. 
7. Sampson's unauthorized control 
over the various limited partnerships 
for a period in excess of four years 
included receiving and disbursing said 
limited partnership funds. In doing so, 
Sampson repeatedly directed limited 
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partners to send money to him and 
not to Richtron. 
t . Sampson executed invalid powers of 
attorney, and attempted to use those 
powers to substitute his newly created 
professional corporation organized for 
the purpose of practicing law, as a 
general partner to an agricultural 
partnership, in violation of the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act, Utah 
C o d e A n n . § § 1 6 - 1 1 - 1 t o - 1 5 
(1987). 
9. After discovering he could not 
substitute his professional corporation 
as a general partner, Sampson attem-
pted to substitute his newly created 
corporation, Ag Management, as 
general partner of the partnerships. 
Despite a district court order in 1982, 
rifrtaring that Sampson's efforts were 
legally invalid, Sampson continued to 
exercise unauthorized control over the 
partnerships. 
10. Sampson violated the Utah 
Limited Partnership Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§4&-2-l to-27 (1989), by 
refusing to amend the certificates of 
the limited partnerships. 
11. Sampson provided information to 
the Internal Revenue Service for the 
purpose of expediting a tax sale of 
Richt ron ' s interests . Thereafter, 
Sampson appeared as the only bidder 
at the sale. 
12. Despite a federal district court 
ruling that the IRS tax sale was void, 
Sampson continued to exercise control 
over the partnerships, and also conti-
nued to receive partnership funds. 
13. Sampson purchased the "Osborn 
judgment* in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-51-27 (1987)/ 
Notwithstanding the overwhelming nature of 
his conduct, Sampson claims the trial court failed 
to consider his 'good faith efforts* in underta-
king a majority of the actions which the trial 
court ultimately found constituted improper 
means. His position is untenable. Negating "good 
faith" is not an dement of a prima facie case of 
intentional interference with economic relations in 
Utah.9 Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 
657 PJd 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the 
trial court's findings negate any conclusion that 
Sampson acted in "good faith." 
Finally, if Sampson uses the term "good faith" 
in the sense that he is claiming his acts were 
"privileged," Sampson bears the burden of raising 
this issue as an affirmative defense. See Leigh 
Furniture, 657 P M at 304. s^mr*^ Hid nt* r*i*> 
faith or privilege as an af f™**^ p4m*+ 
I he is now precluded from raising it for the 
first time on appeal. See James v. Preston, 746 
PJd 799, 801 (Utah a . App. 1987). In conclu-
sion, Sampson's conduct is far more egregious 
than the conduct found sufficient to constitute 
improper means in Leigh Furniture. See 657 P J d 
at 306. We have identified thirteen acts justifiedly 
labeled "improper means," spanning a period of 
57 
wefl over four years, and although "(t]aken in 
isolation, each of the foregoing interferences with 
(Richtron's interests] might be justified as an 
overly zealous attempt to protect (Sampson's 
interests in representing his clients]," Leigh Fur-
niture, 657 PJ2d at 306, the cumulative effect, 
nitm»n«rmg m the failure of the limited partner-
ships, "crossfed] the threshold beyond what is 
i iv i iW»l *nA jiicrifiahk to what is tortious. * Id. 
Cassation 
Sampson claims the trial court's "conclusion" 
that Sampson's interference caused Richtron 
injury is not supported by the trial court's find-
ings of fact, or in the alternative, the findings are 
inconsistent with a conclusion of causation. 
Whether causation has been established is a que-
stion of fact, sec W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts §129 at 
991 (5th ed. 1984), and in the absence of a com-
plete record, we assume the trial court's finding 
of causation is supported by the evidence. See, 
c.g.f Cornish Town v. Kolkr, 758 PJd 919, 922 
(Utah 1988). 
Furthermore, Sampson's daims of error with 
regard to causation are more appropriately dire-
cted to the issue of damages. First, Sampson 
claims that the limited partnership agreements 
were terminable at will, thereby giving either 
party the absolute right to withdraw from the 
obligation at any time. Therefore, according to 
Sampson, Richtron had no right to continue its 
control over the limited partnerships in the future. 
Second, Sampson claims the court's finding thai 
"by May, 1980, Richins and his companies had 
become confronted with substantial financial 
problems, as well as others likewise mentioned 
elsewhere, which were of such magnitude that 
success in overcoming them seemed doubtful," 
precludes or is inconsistent with a conclusion that 
Sampson's intentional interference caused Rich-
tron injury. 
As to the first daim, Sampson acknowledges in 
his brief "at will termination is normally one 
properly of damages rather than causation." As 
to the second daim, there are substantial findings 
to support the trial court's ultimate finding that 
Sampson's conduct caused Richtron loss. Rich-
tron operated the partnerships for many years 
without foreclosures, and despite financial diffi-
culties in 1980, Sampson offered $700,000 for 
Richtron's interests in the limited partnerships at 
the time he now daims those interests had no 
value. Sampson's offer is evidence that he cons-
idered Richtron's interests worth a substantial 
amount of money notwithstanding the purported 
financial difficulties of the time. Based on the 
foregoing, we affirm the trial court's finding of 
causation.4 
DAMAGES 
Sampson's primary argument on appeal is that 
the damage awards are not supported by the trial 
court's findings of fact. Specifically, Sampson 
claims the court erred in awarding 1) 5250,000 to 
Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General as 
•consequential damages," and 2) $30,974.50 to 
Richtron Financial and $4,222.50 to Richtron Inc. 
representing their original capital contributions to 
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certain limited partnerships. < 
We emphasize that neither party is in a position 
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support damages or the trial court's findings of 
fact based thereon. Rather, our review is limited 
to whether the trial court's findings of fact 
support its award of damages. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §774A at 
55 (1979), provides that one who is ultimately 
deemed liable to another for interference with 
economic relations is liable for 'the pecuniary loss 
of the benefits of the contract or the prospective 
relation; [or] consequential losses for which the 
interference is a legal cause ....* Thus, Judge 
Croft's findings must identify actual pecuniary 
losses suffered by Richtron as a result of 
Sampson's conduct. 
With respect to the $250,000 award to Rich-
tron, Inc. and Richtron General, the trial court 
made the following observation: 
As stated before, damages are in tort, 
not in contract, rendering liability for 
damages for either the pecuniary loss 
of the benefits of the contract or 
consequential for which the tortious i 
interference is the legal cause. I think 
that as to some claims for relief, 
damages, of at least a consequential 
nature, have been shown with a reas-
onable degree of certainty by a prep-
onderance of the evidence. 
Sampson claims it was error for the trial court to 
refuse to identify the precise composition of the 
S250,000 award. We agree that Judge Croft was ! 
under the mistaken belief that he need not iden- I 
tify the exact basis for his award. However, this 
court can affirm the judgment if any legal oasis 
exists to justify the trial court's award. See, e.g., 
Beuhner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 
892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
We note that in the context of a damage award, 
a trial court's findings of fact must provide a. 
sufficient basis for this court to determine 
whether there is a rational legal basis as well as a 
sufficient factual basis for the award of damages. See, 
e.g., Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 
(Utah 1983). However, 
[allthough an award of damages 
based only on speculation cannot be I 
upheld, it is generally recognized that 
some degree of uncertainty in the 
evidence of damages will not suffice to 
relieve a defendant from recompensing 
a wronged plaintiff. As long as there 
is some rational basis for a damage 
award, it is the wrongdoer who must 
assume the risk of some uncertainty. 
Where there is evidence of the fact of 
damage, a defendant may not escape 
liability because the amount of 
damage cannot be proved with preci- \ 
sion. | 
Id. at 956 (emphasis added). 
Further, "(o)nce a defendant has been shown to 
have caused a loss, ... the reasonable level of 
certainty required to establish the amount of a 
v. Richins CODE*CO 
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/ loss is generally lower than that required to esta-
blish the fact or cause of a loss.' Cook Assocs., 
Inc. v. Wamick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 
1983Kcitations omittedXemphasis in the original). Ac-
cord Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., Ill P.2d 
773, 774 (Utah 1986); Terry v. Pane*, 631 P.2d 
896, 898 (Utah 1981). "The amount of damages 
may be based upon approximations, if the fact of 
damage is established, and the approximations are 
based upon reasonable assumptions or project-
ions." Atkin Wright A Miles v. Mountain States 
Tel. <ft Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330,336 (Utah 1985). 
Judge Croft found that as of May 16, 1984, 
"Judge Winder's order ended then and there ... 
[Sampson's] right to take any further steps in the 
windup of any affairs of any partnership in which 
the Richtron Companies remained as general 
partners ...." Despite Judge Winder's order, 
Sampson continued from that point to hold and 
collect additional partnership funds. Accordingly, 
Judge Croft's finding provides a reasonable legal 
basis for awarding Richtron damages for 
Sampson's wrongful use and control of partner-
ship funds from the date of Judge Winder's 
J order. 
Judge Croft's findings as to the amount of 
funds wrongfully retained by Sampson after May 
16,1984, include: 
From the evidence the only informa-
tion the court has is that as of the date 
Judge Winder made his ruling, the Ag 
Management account had a balance of 
about $28,700 which by October 29, 
1984 had increased to over $43,000, 
while the account balance of Consol-
idated Farms as of October 29, 1984 
was $245,597, with $74,320 having 
been received since Judge Winder's 
ruling and $12,000 having been disb-
ursed.... 
From these findings, it is clear that following 
Judge Winder's order, which unequivocally den-
ounced Sampson's interest in partnership assets, 
the trial court concluded that Sampson deprived 
Richtron of the use and control of approximately 
$290,000. There are admittedly alternative, inco-
nsistent findings before this court, and ordinarily 
we would resort to the underlying record to det-
ermine which finding of fact is accurate. 
However, Sampson's failure to provide a comp-
lete transcript prevents us from reviewing the 
underlying evidence. Thus, we assume the evid-
ence supports the trial court's findings of fact 
which in turn supports its ultimate damage award. 
See, e.g., Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 
922 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, we fmd that the 
trial court's award of damages to Richtron, Inc. 
and Richtron General has a rational basis and is 
supported by the trial court's findings of fact. 
Finally, Sampson appeals the trial court's 
award of damages to Richtron Financial and 
Richtron, Inc. in the amount of their original 
capital investment in their respective limited par-
tnerships. Sampson claims the damages were 
awarded without a showing by Richtron that at 
the time Sampson took control of the partners-
I hips, their limited partnership interests were worth 
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the original amounts contnbuted. In other words, 
Sampson claims the evidence does not support the 
trial court's findings. As we have stated repeat-
edly throughout this opinion, Sampson is precl-
uded from causing dus challenge because he nas 
failed to marshall the evidence. See, e.g., Harhhe 
v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 19861. 
Accordingly, the trial court's award to Richtron 
Financial and Richtron, Inc. is affirmed. 
Richtron's Cross-Appeal 
In its cross-appeal, Richtron claims the trial 
court erred in refusing to award as damages the 
full amount collected and disbursed by Sampson 
during the first twenty-eight months of his 
unauthorized control of the limited partnerships. 
Richtron also claims the trial court erred in decl-
ining to award damages to Richtron for ail the 
loan advances it made to the limited partnerships. 
We reemphasize that Richtron is held to the same 
standards of review previously set forth in this 
opinion. 
As to Richtron's first claim, the trial court 
found that most of the funds that passed through 
Sampson's hands were paid out to satisfy partn-
ership expenses. As a result, the trial court held 
that to any extent the funds were used to pay 
legitimate partnership obligations, Sampson was 
entitled to a credit. Based on this finding, the tnal 
court refused to award any of the $645,000 req-
uested by Richtron. In the absence of a complete 
record, we assume the court's findings are supp-
orted by the evidence, Cornish Town v. KoUer, 
758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988), and the findings 
dearly support the trial court's refusal to award 
Richtron damages for the total amount collected 
and disbursed by Sampson. 
As to the second claim of error, the trial court 
refused to award Richtron its loan advances based 
on the following findings: 
The evidence did not contain anything 
about loan instruments having been 
prepared when such advances were 
made or repayments being made out 
of gross receipts in accordance with 
the 'terms of the loan instruments/ it 
being noted here and I so find that the 
promissory notes which Richins prep-
ared on or about June 5, 1980 and 
signed for the partnerships as presi-
dent of the general partner, did not 
constitute 'loan instruments* as that 
term was used in the partnership agr-
In addition, the court found that the circumst-
ances triggering repayment as required by certain 
other partnership agreements had not occurred. 
Finally, the court observed: 
Pit is apparent that repayment of the advances to 
the general partners was conditional upon the end 
results of each partnership, which leaves no ass-
urance that any partnership, if properly wound 
up, as provided by law and the partnership agre-
ements, would have been able to repay any of the 
obligations owed by it to the general partner for 
such advances. 
In sum, the trial court's findings do not 
support Richtron's claim that Sampson's intent-
ional interference deprived Richtron of the money 
it had advanced to the limited partnerships, and 
accordingly, we affirm the trial court's refusal to 
award such advances. 
Punitive Damages 
Richtron's final claim of error on cross-appeal 
is that the trial court erred in refusing to award 
Richtron punitive damages. In order to recover 
punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove the 
defendant's conduct was willful and malicious, or 
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference 
and disregard toward the rights of others. See, 
e.g„ Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1988). 'Whether punitive damages [should bej 
awarded is generally a question of fact within the 
sound discretion of the (fact finder],* and will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Bisweil v. 
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 86 (Utah Ct . 
App. 1987). 
Although there are sufficient findings to 
support the reckless disregard standard for the 
award of punitive damages, especially in light of 
Sampson's professional and fiduciary obligations 
as an attorney, we will not substitute our judg-
ment for that of the trial court. The court heard 
the evidence, and had the opportunity to observe 
the witnesses. The tnal court clearly considered 
the appropnate legal standards for imposing 
punitive damages, and concluded Sampson's 
conduct did not rise to the necessary level. Based 
on the foregoing, the trial court's refusal to 
award punitive damages was not an abuse of 
discretion, and accordingly, we affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum we hold that the trial court's findings of 
fact support its conclusion that Sampson interf-
ered with Richtron's economic relations by imp-
roper means, causing Richtron pecuniary loss. We 
further find that the court's findings support its 
award of damages to all of the Richtron parties. 
Finally, we conclude the trial court's findings 
support its refusal to award additional compens-
atory damages to Richtron and its refusal to 
award punitive damages. Based on the foregoing, 
the trial court's judgment is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. In Richmond, the Court observed that while the 
issue of access to civil cases is not before the Court, 
civil trials have historically been open to the public. 
Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581 n.17. On the other 
hand, in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in 
Globe, she states that she interprets 'neither Rich-
mond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to 
carry any implications outside the context of crim-
inal trials.' Globe, 457 U.S. at 611. 
2. Two jurisdictions have examined statutes which, 
unlike the Utah statute, presume juvenile court 
proceedings open unless closure is requested. In 
Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577 
(S.D. 1987), the court interpreted its state statute to 
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allow judges discretion to admit certain enumerated 
parties to the juvenile proceeding, id. at 579. The 
court declined to interpret the statute to mean that 
the judge must allow all enumerated persons access 
to the hearing and stated that once closure is requ-
ested, the court must hold a hearing and take evid-
ence on the need for closure. Id. The court stated 
that the juvenile court must balance the competing 
interest in the confidentiality and anonymity of a 
juvenile court proceeding against the media's rights 
under the first amendment. Id. at 578. In addition, 
the court must consider the juvenile's right to a fair 
trial under the sixth amendment. Id. The court 
concluded that closure should not occur unless the 
court makes specific supported findings that closure 
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. The court then reve-
rsed the trial court's closure order due to unsupp-
orted factual findings. Id. at 580-81. 
In Taylor v. State, 438 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1982) cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 1149, the court affirmed the 
juvenile court's order permitting the media to 
attend a hearing involving a juvenile charged with 
committing robbery resulting in bodily injury. The 
Indiana statute permitted the juvenile court to det-
ermine whether the public should be excluded from 
the proceedings and stated that the court shall con-
sider that the best interests of the community are 
generally served by the public's ability to obtain 
information about charges that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult. The court concluded that 
under the express language of the statute, the 
charged crime fell within the class of cases for which 
access and disclosure are deemed generally to serve 
the best interest of the public. Taylor, 438 N.E.2d at 
280-81. 
3. Kearns-Tribune has not differentiated the two 
types of proceedings in its arguments, and, there-
fore, contends that all types of juvenile court proc-
eedings should be presumptively open to the public. 
4. Section 78-3a-l was amended in 1988, but 
because the section is substantive rather than proc-
edural, we apply the version of the statute in effect 
at the time the cause of action arose. Carlucci v. 
Utah StMte Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336 
(Utah 1986)). Also, the changes made in the statute 
do not affect our analysis. 
5. Kearns-Tribune also asserts that article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which states 
"[a)U courts shall be open/ provides further support 
for its position that juvenile court proceedings 
should be presumptively open. Article I, section 11 
provides, "All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State ... any civil cause to which he 
is a party.* The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
section 11 "guarantees access to the courts and a 
judicial procedure that is based on fairness and 
equality/ Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670, 675 (Utah 1985). In'addition, the constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courthouse was intended 
to confer a remedy by due course of law for injuries 
to person, property or reputation. Id. We reject 
tarns-Tribune's suggestion that section 11 man-
dates that all courts should be physically open. In 
addition, Kearns-Tribune has not asserted how the 
guarantee of access to the courthouse for a remedy 
to injury is rekvant to arguments relating to 
freedom of the press. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the 
tort of intentional interference with economic rela-
tions protects both a party's existing contracts and 
"interest in prospective relationships not yet reduced 
to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to 
be)." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P.2d293, 302 (Utah 1982). 
2. In announcing the elements of a prima facie case, 
the Court discussed the history and development of 
intentional interference with economic relations, 
noting that the "blend of intentional and negligent 
tort principles has produced two different approa-
ches to the definition of this tort." Leigh Furniture, 
657 P.2d at 302. The first approach, followed by 
many jurisdictions and included in the first Restat-
ement of Torts, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that "the defendant intentionally interfered with his 
prospective economic relations and caused him 
injury. * Id. The defendant then bears the burden of 
asserting privilege or justification as an affirmative 
defense. Id. The second approach, modeled after 
other negligent torts, requires a plaintiff to prove 
"liability based on the interplay of various factors." 
Id. at 303. This alternative approach is memorial-
ized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 B 
(1979). It is important to emphasize that the Utah 
Court expressly rejected both approaches and chose, 
instead, to follow "a middle ground" previously 
adopted by the Oregon courts. Id. at 304 (citing Top 
Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 
201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978)). Under Utah's approach, 
improper purpose or means must be established as 
part of a prima facie case and privilege is an affir-
mative defense, which only becomes relevant if 
"'the acts charged would be tortious on the pan of 
an unprivileged defendant.'" Id. at 304 (quoting Top 
Serv. Body Shop, Inc., 582 P.2d at 1371). 
4. Section 78-51-27 provides: 
An attorney or counselor shall not: 
(1) directly or indirectly buy, or be in 
any manner interested in buying or 
having assigned to him, for the purpose 
of collection, a bond, promissory note, 
bill of exchange, book debt, or other 
thing in action, with the intent and for 
the purpose of bringing an action 
thereon. 
(2) by himself, or by or in the name 
of another person, either before or after 
action brought, promise or give, or 
procure to be promised or given, a val-
uable consideration to any person as an 
inducement to placing, or in considera-
tion of having placed, in his hands or in 
the hands of another person a demand 
of any kind for the purpose of bringing 
action thereon or of presenting the 
claimant in the pursuit of any civil 
remedy for the recovery thereof; but this 
subdivision does not apply to any agre-
ement between attorneys and counselors 
to divide between themselves the comp-
ensation to be received. 
An attorney or counselor who violates either of 
the foregoing subdivisions of this section is guilty of 
a misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly, 
and his license to practice may be revoked or susp-
ended. 
5. Sampson relies on authority from jurisdictions 
taking a different approach to the tort of intentional 
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interference with economic relations. For instance, 
Sampson cites a Texas decision wherein the court 
found that the defendant acted in good faith which 
justified his interference with the plaintiffs cont-
ract. See American Petrofina, fac. v. PPG Indus., 
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 740, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
However, Texas courts do not require, as part of a 
prima facie showing, that the defendant acted 
'improperly." Rather, a plaintiff need only demo-
nstrate 1) the existence of a contract, 2) intentional 
and willful interference, 3) proximate causation, and 
4) actual lost. Id. Additionally, on at least one other 
occasion, a Texas court held that it was incumbent 
upon the defendant to prove that his acts were 
either justified or privileged. AnnendMriz v. Mora, 
553 S. W.2d 400,405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
Similarly, Sampson cites Arizona authority where 
the court found that the violation of a statute was 
outweighed by the defendant's good faith reliance 
on a letter from a state agency authorizing his 
conduct. See G.M. Ambulance and Medical Supply 
Co., v. Canyon State Ambulance, Inc., 153 Ariz. 
551, 739 P.2d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1987). However, 
Arizona follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
approach, one specifically rejected by our Supreme 
Court. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293,304 (Utah 1982). 
6. Sampson further asserts that Richtron's claim for 
intentional interference with economic relations is 
barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel, and 
the trial court's failure to so find constitutes rever-
sible error. A trial court is not required to negate all 
allegations in its findings of fact, Sorenson v. Beers, 
614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980), and based on the 
findings of fact, we affirm the trial court's conclu-
sion that Sampson failed to establish waiver or est-
oppel. 
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PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of driving 
without a valid Utah license. The charge origin-
ated in the justice of the peace court where defe-
ndant was convicted. Upon his appeal to the 
circuit court he was again convicted. Defendant 
contends that he is a citizen of Wyoming and 
possesses a valid Wyoming driver's license. His 
Wyoming license was introduced as a trial exhibit.1 
Therefore, he argues, he was not driving 
without a valid driver's license. 
Plaintiff Monticello City filed a motion to 
summarily dismiss this appeal, asserting that 
under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26<13)(a) 
(1988), this court has no jurisdiction. We deferred 
ruling upon the jurisdictional issue until after the 
briefs were filed and the case was at issue in order 
that defendant have a full opportunity to present 
his case and because we had no record before us 
of the justice and circuit court proceedings. We 
now discuss the issue of our appellate court juri-
sdiction over appeals which originate in the justice 
of the peace courts and are reviewed by trial 
'anew* in the circuit courts. 
We are prevented from reaching the merits of 
defendant's appeal if we do not have jurisdiction 
over the case. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 
1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (the initial 
inquiry of a court is to determine its own jurisd-
iction). Under section 77-35-26(13Xa), we have 
jurisdiction over a criminal matter originating in a 
justice court only when the validity or constituti-
onality of an ordinance or statute has been raised in 
the justice court. We therefore examine the 
record to determine what issues were raised and 
argued in the justice court. 
We recognize that a justice of the peace court is 
not a court of record, Utah Code Ann. §78-5-
0.5 (1987), and a tape recording or transcript of 
the proceedings in justice court is not necessarily 
available. Section 77-35-26X13Xa) requires that 
the requisite constitutional challenge be initiated 
in the justice court. Without a reliable record of 
the proceedings there it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the proper issue was adequately raised 
and preserved for review. However, an appeal 
from the justice court affords defendant a trial 
'anew" in the circuit court, which is a court of 
record. Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-2 (1987). 
We presume that if the challenge was properly 
and adequately raised in the circuit court, then it 
was also properly raised in the justice of the peace 
court. Conversely, if a specific challenge to the 
constitutionality or validity of a statute or ordin-
ance was not raised in the circuit court, we 
assume that it was not previously made an issue 
in the justice court. Therefore, in order that the 
proper, specific constitutional or statutory chall-
enge be preserved, that challenge must clearly 
have been raised in and presented to the circuit 
court. 
Upon review of the record filed herein, we find 
that defendant did file a written motion to dismiss 
the charge in the justice court. That motion was 
essentially renewed in the circuit court and was 
based upon his assertion that the city ordinance 
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MR, HARMON: 
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the Court in finding 232 
acknowledges that there are damages of a consequential nature and 
then, however, the Court does not go on with any to identify what 
damages the Court is referring what evidence supports that 
particular statement, and then the Court goes on and awards the 
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against Mr. 
Sampson. As we have outlined here on page 5, I think the Court 
walked through all the various theories, and then the Court 
dispelled most of these theories, and I guess our position is we 
don't have any idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from. 
THE COURT: 
Do you have any idea when a jury comes in with a verdict for 
$25,000 in a $100,000 as to where it got that figure? I have 
seen that hundreds of times in trials that I have presided over. 
You don't know how they have arrived at those figures, 
generally. 
I gave considerable thought to this problem. It was, I 
guess, one of my major things that I wrestled with. There wasn't 
any doubt in my mind based upon the record made during the trial 
that John Sampson had intentionally interferred with an existing 
economic relationship, and that all of the elements, both the 
means and the manner that were spelled out by our Supreme Court 
as constituting elements of that particular tort to me were 
clearly established by the evidence. 
I think you will recall that while I could see Sampson's 
representation of Richtron companies in various lawsuits was 
probably—turned out to be a conflict of interest when he was 
also opposing them, and that that might have been a breach of 
duty, maybe there was a negligence on the part of Sampson as 
alleged in one of the counts. I felt that while those particular 
counts may have been proven insofar as allegations of wrong doing 
was concerned, the record didn't present specific evidence that 
enabled me to say, yes, because he represented, and I expect 
maybe Mr- Anderson might talk about this in his, because he 
represented us in a dozen lawsuits, or was supposed to represent 
us and failed to do so we had default judgments taken against 
us. 
The record doesn't tell me what the defendants' damages were 
as a result of proximate cause of .those factors. And I felt that 
the tort, and I stress the tort aspect of the cause of action 
about the intentional interference with an existing economic 
relation, and I don't think we'll ever get a more clear cut 
example of that being done than we have in 
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this case. 
But that particular thing was not a contract violation. 
Recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships. It was a tort 
just like you run a red light and crash into your car. I commit 
a tort and you are injured. And you are entitled to recover 
damages. But how much? Well, the jury says $25,000. You wanted 
$100,000. You get $25,000, see. 
And, so, I considered the evidence at substantial length. 
What exactly was the total of the advances made by the general 
partners to the limited partners. I am trying to say I don't 
know. Because various exhibits that came into evidence gave us 
different amounts. $75,000 goes for overhead expenses. I don't 
know what they were. Maybe they were to pay John Sampson's law 
office expenses. I don't know. 
$100,000 goes out to Sampson as attorneys' fees. Well, I 
can't say that he's not entitled to attorneys' fees for all that 
he did in this case, and, therefore, I wouldn't say the money was 
spent for attorneys' fees or that Sampson took for attorneys' 
fees was all wrongfully taken in view of the history of this 
thing and, therefore, that's one specific element of damage that 
the general partners 
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are entitled to recover. 
I think if I took the time I could think of other similar 
examples- A factor that I examined closely and brought out in my 
findings was Richins' contention with respect to the value of all 
the property which—for which he was seeking millions of dollars 
in damages, you see. Yet on his bankruptcy schedules the value 
of the properties listed as being properties in which RFC had an 
interest fell far below his $9 and $12 million figures that he 
set forth in some of his exhibits. I have no way of knowing what 
value of the loss of those properties could be assessed if any. 
I guess I will talk more about this when I hear from Mr. 
Anderson. But I concluded that Richins1 conduct was indeed 
intentional. That it was an interference. 
I don't mean Richins. I mean Sampson. That it was an 
interference with an existing economic relationship—several 
existing economic relationships. As I pointed out in seven 
months at the end of 1980 he literally controlled all of the 
partnerships. And there is something to be said for his doing 
that on the other side of the question, too. And I recognize 
that. And we'll probably talk about that some more with Mr. 
Anderson. 
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But the end result is that is the defendants in the case end 
up with nothing because of Sampson's conduct. And I felt that 
his conduct justified as a substantial recovery. And as I said, 
I wrestled with my thoughts for hours trying to think of a basis 
for fixing a figure, and that's the figure I came up with. It's 
less than what some exhibits claim the advances were. I think I 
pointed out in my findings that the repayment of those advances 
had substantial uncertainty if all of the partnerships had been 
dissolved and liquidated in an orderly, proper fashion, all 
expenses paid and the property sold for the best price they could 
collect. 
I point out that there still may not have been any money 
left to pay all or even part of the advances. So, I don't think 
that the advances gives me necessarily an accurate measure of 
damages that I could award to them. If I had done so it would 
be, maybe, $100,000 more than it is. 
There were many factors that I weighed and considered and 
you see them scattered throughout my findings. And, so, I just 
concluded this is a tort. Damages was caused by Sampson through 
his conduct. I find it was not such conduct as justified 
punitive damages, and will be talking about that, I am sure, but 
that the defendants were entitled to a substantial 
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recovery- In no sense of the word could I go to Richins $5 
million and $6 million and $9 million and $12 million figures in 
arriving at damages because the evidence wasn't there. Credible 
evidence wasn't there that I could accept as being a proper 
foundation for a measure of damages. But I just say that that's 
the amount I came up with and I don't think I am obligated to say 
that the $250,000 is made up of $250,000 in advances which I 
think he would have recovered if they'd have orderly liquidated 
all of the partnerships or that it is made up of $100,000 
attorneys' fees Sampson took plus the $75,000 that he used for 
overhead, plus another $75,000 for some other specific item. 
You see, and that's the reason I did what I did, and I don't 
think I can really—need to do or can do any different. 
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